Using panel data from US states, I measure the impact of partisanship on a wide range of different policy settings and economic outcomes. Across 32 measures, there are surprisingly few differences in policy settings, social outcomes and economic outcomes under Democrats and Republicans. In terms of policies, Democratic Governors tend to prefer slightly higher minimum wages and more redistributive taxes. Under Republican Governors, incarceration rates are higher, while welfare caseloads are higher under Democratic Governors. In terms of social and economic outcomes, Democratic Governors tend to preside over higher median post-tax income, lower post-tax inequality, and lower unemployment rates. However, for 25 of the 32 dependent variables, gubernatorial partisanship does not have a statistically significant impact on policy outcomes and social welfare. I find no evidence of gubernatorial partisan differences in welfare generosity, the number of government employees or their salaries, state revenue, incarceration rates, execution rates, pre-tax incomes and inequality, crime rates, suicide rates, and test scores. These results are robust to the use of regression discontinuity estimation, to take account of the possibility of reverse causality. Overall, it seems that Governors behave in a fairly non-ideological manner.
Introduction
What do Democrats and Republicans do? On one level, this is the question that millions of American voters ask themselves as they enter the ballot boxes. Yet in an empirical sense, we know surprisingly little about how policy choices and welfare outcomes differ under the two major political parties. This paper seeks to provide evidence on partisan differences, by using panel data to explore the policies and outcomes under US state governments over the past forty years.
Politico-economic models commonly characterize political parties as merely two teams of selfinterested players, willing to present any set of policies that will win them a plurality of the vote.
Under the classic model put forward by Downs (1957) , candidates' motivations for competing for office are solely to enjoy its perquisites. This model is the dominant one in the literature.
Indeed, as Roemer (2001) points out, the oft-cited "median voter theorem" is the Nash equilibrium result that follows from an application of the Downsian model, where voter preferences are unidimensional. Under Downs' model, party ideology is irrelevant -rather than labeling the two largest parties "left" and "right", one might as well call them "A" and "B".
Others, however, have attempted to explicitly model the role of ideology. Wittman (1973) proposes a model in which parties have policy preferences, which represent the aggregate utility of their members.
1 Dixit and Londregan (1998) characterize redistributive ideology as exogenous, and show how the choice of outcomes is a function of ideology, the "power hunger"
of each party, the variance of pre-tax incomes, and the political power of poor and rich constituents.
Another strand in the literature goes further still, and models outcomes as a product not only of electoral competition between parties, but also competition within parties. Thus Dhami (2003) describes a system in which each party has two factions -opportunists and militants. Roemer (2001) goes further still -modeling three factions within each of the major parties (militants, opportunists, and reformists), a two-dimensional policy space (left-right and authoritarianlibertarian) , and uncertainty about the mapping of policies onto outcomes. As examples of the issues that might characterize the left-right and authoritarian-libertarian divides, Roemer suggests taxation and race, respectively.
What empirical evidence exists on partisan differences? Most research has partisanship has tended to focus on macroeconomic outcomes. Hibbs (1987) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) present models in which an exploitable Phillips curve is available to policymakers. 2 They find that under Democratic Presidents, growth is higher, and unemployment lower; while under
Republican Presidents, inflation is lower. Across developed democracies, Lange and Garrett (1985) and Scruggs (2001) find evidence that when countries have left-leaning governments or strong labor movements, they tend to grow more slowly, but the presence of both (or neither) leads to more rapid growth and investment.
Turning to income distribution, Stigler (1970) contended that as parties pursued the median voter, both will tend to redistribute towards the middle class, at the expense of rich and poor. Yet Bartels (2003) finds otherwise. Comparing the rate of growth of each quintile in the population, Bartels concludes that the partisan gap is greatest for those at the 20 th percentile, who can expect their incomes to grow 2.4 percent faster under a Democratic President than under a Republican President. 3 When unemployment, inflation and GDP growth rates are included in the model, the partisan effect disappears, suggesting that at the federal level, macroeconomic management is the main channel through which policymakers affect the distribution of income. None of these models account for the potential endogeneity of party choice (though this is hardly surprising, given the relatively small number of US federal elections for which good income distribution data exists).
2 The difference between the models is that Hibbs (1987) assumes backward-looking inflation expectations, while Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) assume rational expectations over inflation. In support of the rational partisan model, Alesina and Rosenthal present evidence that the partisan gap is largest in the first half of each election term (1995, (180) (181) This paper represents an advance over the previous literature in three respects. First, while some of the previous papers use cross-sectional variation, it uses panel data, controlling for state and year fixed effects that might have a direct impact on policies and outcomes. Second, it tests the impact of partisanship on a much wider array of policy variables and outcomes than previous papers have done. Third, it explicitly models the impact of voter ideology on political outcomes, and takes into account the possibility that party choice may be endogenous to expected economic circumstances in the future.
In analyzing differences between Democrats and Republicans, I consider three sets of outcomes.
The first are pure policy variables, such as the minimum wage and tax rates, which can be cleanly measured and which reflect only the choices made by policymakers. The second category of outcomes are those that reflect both policy choices and economic conditions, such as expenditure on transfer programs (which is a function of both the supply of and demand for welfare), or the incarceration rate (a function of the strictness of the police and legal system and the number of crimes committed). The third category are pure welfare variables, such as mean incomes, unemployment, inequality, education, crime and suicide.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical strategy.
Section 3 presents results, and the final section concludes.
An Empirical Strategy for Estimating Partisan Effects
To gauge the causal effect of partisanship on state outcomes, I focus on governors, rather than state legislatures. This is partly because most of the existing literature on partisanship has concerned itself with the affiliation of the chief executive, rather than the legislature. In addition, credible identification of election outcomes is more straightforward in a two-person contest. A governor who wins with 50.1 percent of the vote is considerably less constrained in her actions than a legislature in which one party holds the balance of power by a one-vote margin.
To model how partisanship affects a given outcome, I regress that a given policy or outcome on an indicator for whether the Governor is a Democrat. Since policies and economic outcomes tend to be correlated within states and within years, all specifications include both state and year fixed effects. To this parsimonious specification, I then progressively add the following additional controls: In all cases, standard errors are clustered at the state * electoral term level.
When considering economic outcomes, it is important to note that while policies take effect immediately, they may only have an impact on economic conditions after some lag. Given this, If voter choice is exogenous to expected economic conditions, then the estimates derived from the above specifications will accurately reflect the policy choices of Democrats and Republicans.
However, a question of endogeneity arises. If voters are able to forecast future economic circumstances with some accuracy, and if they believe that the parties are differently suited to certain economic environments, then the party elected is not exogenous to the prevailing economic conditions. For example, suppose that voters thought that Democrats were better able to manage the economy in a slump, while Republicans were better able to manage the economy 5 in a boom. In this case, Democrats will be more likely to be elected when a recession is on the horizon, and the average growth rate under Democrats will be lower than that under Republicans.
A similar mechanism could apply to other outcomes, such as crime. Thus if voter choice is endogenous to the anticipated socio-economic environment when making their party choice, then the outcomes observed under Democrats and Republicans may not reflect their respective policy choices.
To take account of this, possibility, I add a further control to specifications that focus upon social and economic outcomes:
The share of the vote received by the Democratic gubernatorial candidate: In this specification, the policy effect is estimated from the discontinuity that occurs when a gubernatorial candidate wins more than 50% of the vote. The use of regression discontinuity techniques to study US election outcomes was pioneered by Lee (2003) and Lee, Moretti and Butler (2004) , who estimate the causal effect of incumbency on winning, and electoral strength on voting patterns. 4 Most similar to this paper is the approach of Pettersson-Lidbom (2003) , who uses regression discontinuity methods to estimate the effects of partisanship in Swedish local elections. In the regression discontinuity specification, I drop non-contested elections (those in which one party won 80 percent or more of the vote), and elections in which one of the top two candidates is an independent.
Note that the purpose of controlling for the Democrat candidate's share of the vote is to take into account the function through which voters' expectations of the state of the economy might map onto their choice of candidate. Note however that this assumes that governors who win with a larger margin will behave in the same manner as those eke out a narrow win. If this is not the case, it this will most likely cause attenuation bias in the coefficient of interest. 4 However, while Lee and co-authors are able to identify 16,000 house races, there are substantially fewer gubernatorial elections in the post-war era. As a result, their main empirical strategies -restricting the sample to only the closest elections, and including high-order polynomials, are likely to both overtax the available data. 5 There is a small body of theoretical work (Llavador 2001 ) and empirical evidence (Diermeier and Merlo 1999) suggesting that policy outcomes might be related to vote share. 
Estimating Partisan Differences

Policy Settings
The first set of policies upon which one might expect to observe partisan differences are tax policies. To the extent that parties have differing attitudes towards redistribution, they may choose to raise or lower the overall tax burden, change the corporate/personal income tax mix, or change the redistributivity of the personal income tax.
The first four rows of Using the log of the real maximum welfare amount for a family of four as the dependent variable, I find no significant partisan differences. The same is true for the log of the number of state employees, and the log of the average real wage of state employees. While Republicans rhetoric in gubernatorial contests often focuses on reducing the size of government, this does not appear to be borne out in policy outcomes.
Intermediate Outcomes
I now proceed to estimating a set of intermediate outcomes, which are affected by both policies and economic and social conditions: the unionization rate, incarceration and execution rates, welfare rolls, expenditure on transfers, income from taxation, and state revenue.
The first row of Table 3 shows the relationship between partisanship and the unionization rate.
Although the Democrats are strongly allied to the union movement, unions do not appear to fare better under a state Democratic governor. The next rows indicate that incarceration rates are about 1/10th of a standard deviation lower under a Democratic Governor (although this finding is not robust to all specifications), while execution rates are unrelated to partisanship. For the most part, the parties are similarly "tough on crime". 6 While gubernatorial partisanship is unrelated to unemployment insurance receipt and transfer payments, the welfare caseload is approximately 1-2% higher under a Democratic Governor. 1. Demographic controls are the log of the state population, and the fraction of the state's population that is under 15, over 65, and African-American. 2. Legislative controls are indicator variables for the Democrats having a majority in both houses, and the Republicans having a majority in both houses. 3. Voter ideology is the average Poole-Rosenthal score of the state's delegation to the federal House of Representatives in the most recent election. 4. Democratic voteshare is a linear control in the democratic candidate's share of the gubernatorial vote. In this specification, non-competitive elections (those in which one candidate won more than 80% of the vote) are dropped. Table 4 shows four "tax and spend" variables: income tax receipts, other tax receipts (mostly company tax), non-tax governmental income (license fees), and total state government revenue.
None appear to be significantly correlated with gubernatorial partisanship. Consistent with Alt and Lowry 2000, the coefficient on legislative partisanship is significant in the total revenue regressions (not shown). The partisan effects for all tax and spend variables appear to be confined to legislatures -taxation and spending policies do not appear to differ significantly between Republican and Democratic governors. 
Social Welfare Measures
The last set of dependent variables are pure social welfare measures: income, wages, unemployment, poverty, inequality and crime rates. With the possible exception of inequality, there is a broad consensus across the two parties about the importance of achieving these goals.
However, the parties differ in the prominence that they give to these goals, with Republicans tending to put greater emphasis on crime and growth, and Democrats tending to put greater emphasis on poverty and unemployment. To the extent that politics involves allocating resources from less favored to more favored projects, partisan differences in policy preferences could still reveal themselves in these social welfare measures.
To begin with, I calculate measures of mean and median family income. Since these figures are not publicly available at a state level, I use microdata from the 1963-2003 Current Population Surveys, and calculate the equivalized family income for each individual by dividing total family income by the square root of the number of family members. The first set of outcomes in Table 5 estimate the effect of partisanship on mean pre-tax and post-tax family income, median pre-tax and post-tax family income, and real wages. While the first three of these are small and insignificant, median post-tax family income is about 1% higher under a Democratic Governor (though this is not significant in the regression discontinuity specification). The coefficient on real wages is negative, but not statistically significant. Poverty rates and pre-tax inequality are not statistically related to partisanship, but post-tax inequality is about 1/3rd of a gini point lower under a Democratic Governor -providing some evidence in favor of the theory that the defining difference between left and right is the parties' attitude to inequality (Bobbio 1996) . 1. Demographic controls are the log of the state population, and the fraction of the state's population that is under 15, over 65, and African-American. 2. Legislative controls are indicator variables for the Democrats having a majority in both houses, and the Republicans having a majority in both houses. 3. Voter ideology is the average Poole-Rosenthal score of the state's delegation to the federal House of Representatives in the most recent election. 4. Democratic voteshare is a linear control in the democratic candidate's share of the gubernatorial vote. In this specification, non-competitive elections (those in which one candidate won more than 80% of the vote) are dropped.
Measures of work, education, crime and suicide are shown in Table 6 . Only one of these impacts is significant: in some specifications, the unemployment rate is 0.2-0.3 percentage points lower under a Democratic Governor. Test scores, property crime, violent crime, murder and suicide are not significantly related to partisanship. While this could potentially be due to reporting differences in the case of property crime and violent crime, this is much less likely in the case of murder and suicide, which are almost always reported. Overall, given that Republicans are often typified as being "tougher" on crime than Democrats, it is interesting to find no systemic partisan difference in crime rates. 1. For all specifications except where the dependent variable is log population, demographic controls are the log of the state population, and the fraction of the state's population that is under 15, over 65, and African-American. 2. Where the dependent variable is log population, demographic controls are the fraction of the state's population that is under 15, over 65, and African-American. 3. Legislative controls are indicator variables for the Democrats having a majority in both houses, and the Republicans having a majority in both houses. 4. Voter ideology is the average Poole-Rosenthal score of the state's delegation to the federal House of Representatives in the most recent election. 5. Democratic voteshare is a linear control in the democratic candidate's share of the gubernatorial vote. In this specification, non-competitive elections (those in which one candidate won more than 80% of the vote) are dropped.
Robustness Checks
Could it be that policymakers are stymied by large offsetting interstate migration flows? In the context of progressive taxation, Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) argue that migration prevents state policymakers from redistributing income. However, Chernick (2004) and Leigh (2005) have found evidence to the contrary. Similarly, looking at a broader range of policies, Wu, Perloff and Golan (2002) conclude that progressive taxes and the Earned Income Tax Credit reduce inequality within a state, while raising the minimum wage increases state inequality. 7 One way of testing this is to see whether the election of Democrats or Republicans is systematically associated with population flows. This theory is tested in the final row of Table 6 , which show small and insignificant relationships between partisanship and the size of a state's population.
The absence of a statistically significant relationship lends weight to the interpretation that it is convergent preferences rather than an inability to affect outcomes that explains these results.
Conclusion
At a state level, the party in power makes little difference to most policy settings. Democratic
Governors tend to prefer slightly higher minimum wages and more redistributive taxes. Under
Republican Governors, incarceration rates are higher, while welfare caseloads are higher under Democratic Governors. In terms of social welfare, Democratic Governors tend to preside over higher median post-tax income, lower post-tax inequality, and lower unemployment rates.
There are many areas in which gubernatorial partisanship does not appear to have an impact on policy outcomes and social welfare. I find no evidence of gubernatorial partisan differences in welfare generosity, the number of government employees or their salaries, state revenue, incarceration rates, execution rates, pre-tax incomes and inequality, crime rates, suicide rates, and test scores.
There are two possible interpretations of these results. One is that the policy preferences of
Democrats and Republicans at a state level are largely similar, while another is that there are strong partisan differences in policy preferences, but that cross-state migration mitigates the effects. However, the fact that there are small partisan differences in policy settings, coupled with the absence of any systematic relationship between population flows and partisanship, favors the explanation that partisan policy preferences are similar. In state government, it seems that a donkey really does behave a lot like an elephant.
Data Appendix
Political Variables and Controls
State political variables are from ICPSR. 1995 . Candidate Name and Constituency Totals, 1788 -1990 2), 5th ed. Ann Arbor, MI; updated using figures from the Congressional Quarterly database.
Poole-Rosenthal scores are downloaded from Keith Poole's website (http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm, updated 10 December 2004). I drop all legislators except Democrats and Republicans, and use the first common space score, which has a potential range from -1 to 1, and which Poole and Rosenthal describe as picking up "liberal-conservative" in the modern era. For each state and election year, I calculate the mean score for legislators serving in the House of Representatives, and apply the same score to the following year, in which no election took place. 
Policy Settings
Top income tax and corporate tax rates from the World Tax Database, at the Ross School of Business in the University of Michigan (http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/introduction.htm).
Tax redistributivity is the amount by which the income taxation system reduces the gini coefficient. This measure, and average taxation rates, reflect only the tax policies, since they are calculated using the method outlined in Leigh (2005) . In brief, this involves taking a single sample of respondents from the March 1990 CPS, and adjusting the average income of the respondents so that it is the same as the average income in a given state and year. To simplify calculations, I assume that all family income is wage income, that individuals file as singles, and couples file jointly (with 2/3rds of the income assigned to the primary earner). Dependent exemptions and age exemptions are taken into account. Post-tax income is net of state and federal taxes, but not net of FICA, which is regarded as akin to savings. Since Taxsim only includes state taxes from 1977 onwards, earlier years are not included in the analysis. The tax burden is then calculated for each state and year. From this, it is possible to calculate the tax redistribution index and the average tax rate. These figures reflect only policy effects, and not behavioral responses. 
Social Welfare Measures
Average income and inequality measures are calculated from the March Current Population Survey, using Stephen Jenkins' "ineqdeco" Stata routine. Since the CPS asks households about earnings in the previous year, the surveys provide data on household income from 1962-2002. Family income is adjusted for family size by dividing by the square root of the family size, and data is weighted by person-weights. Family incomes that are less than 1/10th of the median, and more than 10 times the median, are recoded to those values. The year 1962 was dropped, since it contains a substantial number of unrealistically high incomes, suggesting potential coding problems. Although the CPS is designed to be representative at a state level, the person-weights that are provided are calculated based on national demographics, rather than state demographics. However, this is unlikely to make a substantial difference. Using the CPS for California, a state whose demographic composition is very different to the nation as a whole, Reed, Haber and Mameesh (1996, Appendix B) used census data to form new CPS weights for California, and found that it made virtually no difference to their estimates of state inequality.
Post-tax income and post-tax inequality are calculated by using the NBER's Taxsim program (Feenberg and Coutts 1995) , treating income and exemptions in the same manner as outlined in the "Policy Settings" section above. Since Taxsim only covers 1977 onwards, our post-tax estimates are only for 1977-2002.
Whether a family is below the poverty line is provided in the CPS files in later years, and were added for earlier years by Unicon. Using this information, I calculate poverty rates for each state and year.
Unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://data.bls.gov/).
National
Assessment of Educational Progress scores are from http://www.nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/naepdata/. Fourth grade reading scores are used on the basis that they are available for more states and years than any other test.
Property crime rate and violent crime rate from the Bureau of Justice Statistics -Data Online (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs). Crime rates are the number of crimes committed per 100,000 people per year.
